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tion on which there is some disagreement. Upon a narrow
inspection it will probably appear that usage and custom had
there sanctioned just such rules for solemnizing marriage as were
adopted here in this country through all the Colonies, so as to.
have become, in the absence of statutory provisions, the American
Common Law. The accidental neglect of some directions in these
statutes would not render the intended marriage a nullity, while
the delinquent parties would be subjected to prescribed penalties
for an offence against morals. Yet some form would be requisite
to meet the mandate8 of our statutes, or the civil regulations
established, time out of mind, under general usage.
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In New York, where the rule in Shelley's Case is abolished, where land is granted
to A. for life, and after his death, then to his heirs and their assigns for ever,
the persons who, at the termination of the life estate, are the heirs of A., take
as purchasers, and not by descent.
The remainder so limited is contingent, and the heirs apparent of the tenant for
life have a future contingent estate, which under the statute of New York,
making "future estates descendible, devisable, and alienable in the same manner as estates in possession," will pass by their grant of the land in fee.
The child of an heir apparent whose mother dies before her ancestor, will not in
-such case be estopped by covenants of warranty in her mother's deed.

The facts of the case appear in the opinion.
N. B. Morse, D. B. Wheeler, and Everett P. Wheeler, for. the
appellant (defendant below).
D. P. Barnard,for the respondent (plaintiff below).
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LOTT, J.-This action was commenced in the City Court of
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Brooklyn, on the 22d day of May, 1861, for the recovery of a lot
of land lying in the city of Brooklyn, being a .part of a large
tract formerly owned by Samuel Jackson. He, by a deed bearing
date the 15th day of February, 1832, granted and conveyed the
whole of said tract to John Jackson, named therein as party of the
second part, "for and during his natural life, and after his decease
to his heirs and their assigns," with a habendum clause inr the following terms, viz.: "To have and to hold the above granted, bargained, and described premises, with the appurtenances, unto the
said party of the second part, for and during his natural life; and
after his death, then to his heirs and their assigns to their own
proper use, benefit, and behoof for ever."
This deed contains the usual covenants of seii n, and for quiet
possession, and against incumbrances, and also contains a covenant
by the grantor for the further assurance of the premises intended
to be granted "to the said party of the second part, his heirs and
their assigns, after the natural life of the said party of the second
part for ever," and a covenant of general warranty'thereof "unto
the said party of the second part for and during his natural life,
then to -his heirs and their assigns for ever."
The said John Jackson, on the 25th day of April, 1848, had
eleven children, who if he had then died would have been his only
heirs at law, and he on that day executed a deed with full covenants
and warranty to those children, purporting to convey a large tract.
of land, including that in question, for the consideration 'of one
thousand dollars.
Subsequently, and on the 14th day of August, 1848, those children made a partition among themselves of the land so conveyed by
their father, and executed deeds to each other with covenants of
quiet and peaceable possession, to carry the same into effect. A
number of lots, including that sought to be recovered in this action,
were thereupon conveyed to Parmenus and Edward Jackson, two
of the sons, by their brothers and sisters, and other lots were in
like manner conveyed to Rosetta Jackson and Fanny Jackson, two
of the daughters.
The said Parmenus and Edward Jackson afterwards, and on the
VoL. XII.-O
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1st day of May, 1848, executed a mortgage purporting to convey
the same in fee to William Beard, to secure the payment of the
sum of three hundred dollars, with interest. That mortgage was
subsequently foreclosed, the lot was sold on such foreclosure, and
the mortgagee, the said William Beard, became the purchaser thereof, who afterwards, and on the 1st day of February, 1855, conveyed the same to Herbert T. Moore, the plaintiff.
Fanny Jackson, one of the said daughters, after the said partition deeds were executed, was lawfully married to Parker Baldwin,
and continued his wife until the 3d day of June, 1859, when she
died, leaving Fanning Baldwin her only child and issue, her surviving, who was born February 21st, 1859, and was living when
this action was tried. Subsequent to such death of the said Fanny,
and on the 5th day of March, 1861, the said John Jackson, her
father, died, leaving all of said children, except the said Fanny, his
survivors.
The defendant claimed to hold the premises in question as tenant
of the said Parmenus Jackson, and put the title of the plaintiff,
who claimed the same in fee simple, in issue. Upon the fact$ above
stated, the City Judge, who by the consent of the parties tried the
issue without a jury, decided that the plaintiff, on the 18th day of
February, 1855, was possessed of the premises in question as the
owner thereof in fee simple, and that the defendant, on the 1st day
of May, 1860, evicted him, and unlawfully withheld the possession
thereof from him, and directed judgment for the plaintiff.
This judgment was in our opinion erroneous. It was evidently
the intention and object of the deed of Samuel to convey to John
Jackson a life estate only, and as it was executed subsequent to the
time the Revised Statutes took effect, it must be construed by the
rules prescribed thereby. They expressly provide, 1 Rev. Stat.
p. 725, § 28, that "when a remainder shall be limited to heirs, or
heirs of the body of a person, to whom a life estate in the same
premises shall be given, the persons who on the termination of. the
life estate shall be the heirs, or the heirs of the body of such tenant
for life, shall be entitled to take as purchasers by virtue of the remainder so limited to them." This provision abrogates the rule in
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Shelley's Case, under which John Jackson would have held the title
in fee as absolute owner, and his heirs could only have claimed by
inheritance from him.
He, by his deed, could only convey the life estate held by him,
and as he did not die till the 5th day of March, 1861, that estate
under his deed to his children passed and became vested in them.
The question is then presented, whether those children had any
estate or interest in the remainder during the lifetime of their
father, the tenant for life. The limitation in the deed is to his
heirs, and by the provisions above recited it is declared that in
such a case the persons who on the termination of the life estate
shall be such heirs, shall be entitled to take as purchasers by virtue
of the remainder so limited to them. The term "heirs" is thereby
changed from a word of limitation to one of purchase, and a mere
descriptio pereonarum, or specific designation of the individuals
who, when the life estate determines, shall have the right to the
possession and enjoyment of the property. Until that event occurs
there is or can be no person in existence that answers to or falls
within the description or class of persons designated, nemo est hwres
viventis, and therefore no persons can stand in the relation of heir,
or fall within the meaning of that term, until the death of the tenant
for life, and upon that event the remainder becomes vested in possession. There is, nevertheless, by the very terms of the deed, an
estate in remainder, created at the time of its delivery. It is,
however, one in expectancy merely, limited'by the terms of the
grant to take effect or commence in the possession at a future day
(on the death of the tenant for life), and it is therefore denominated
a future estate. Such estates are said to be vested when there is a
person in being who would have an immediate right to the possession of the lands upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate. They are contingent, whilst the person to whom, or
the event upon which, they are limited to take effect remains uncertain." See Rev. Stat. p. 722, §§ 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 28.
In the case under consideration, there was no person in being
during the lifetime of John Jackson, as before stated, who stood
or could stand in the relation or character of heir to him, and
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consequently no one who could be said to have an immediate right
of possession to the land on the termination of his life estate. Until
that event, it remained unknown and uncertain what persons would
be his heirs, and entitled to take. The remainder limited to them
was therefore a contingent future estate: Such appears to be the
construction put on section 28," above referred to by Chancellor
KENT in his Commentaries, Vol. 4, p. 232.
He there, after quoting the section and saying that the rule in
Shelley's Case was thereby abolished, says: "The abolition of the
rule applies equally to deeds and wills, and in its practical operation it will, in cases where the rule would otherwise have applied,
change estates in fee into contingent remainders." See-also Campbell vs. IBawdon, 18 N. Y. Rep. 416.
Assuming'then that the said children had such an estate, the
operation and effect of the partition deeds executed between them
remains to be considered.
It is provided by the Revised Statutes, Vol. 1, p. 725, § 35, "that
expectant estates are descendible, devisable, and alienable in the
same manner- as estates in possession." In these are included con.
tingent estates in remainder: Id.p. 722, § 7-11 and 18, before
referred to.
Their contingent estate in remainder was therefore alienable,
and it was competent for them to convey the same as well as the
estate for life of John Jackson, which had become vested in them
at the time their deeds were executed. They were then of full
age, and competent to convey and pnter into the covenants contained in those deeds.
Those executed to Parmenus and Edward Jackson conveyed all
the estate and interest of their brothers and sisters at that time to
them, and the mortgage from them to Beard passed to him this as
well as that which was held, or to which they were entitled, in their
own right; and the plaintiff, under the proceedings in foreclosure
of that mortgage, and by the deed of Beard to him, became the
owner, entitled to the same rights. See'Lawrence vs. Bayard, T
Paige 76.
All of those children, except Fanny Baldwin, survived John Jack
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son, their father, and they, with Fanning Baldwin, the only issue
of Fanny, on his death became and were his only heirs at law, and
their estate, which had before been contingent, became vested in
possession and absolute; and thereupon the plaintiff became the
owner in his own right in fee simple of all the estate in the lot in
question, except the share (being one eleventh part) in which
Fanny Baldwin, until her death, had a contingent estate. That
estate determined by her death, and upon the death of John Jackson, Fanning Baldwin, who was one of the heirs at law, became
vested with the title to that share in fee simple as purchaser under
the deed to his grandfather, and not as heir at law to his mother.
Her covenants do not, therefore, affect the title.
The result of the views above expressed is that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover ten eleventh equal parts of the lot in question,
being the shares of the surviving children of John Jackson, but
that he had no right to the share of Fanning Baldwin (the other
eleventh), which had become vested in him before the defendant
entered into the possession of the premises, and which was then
and has continued to be outstanding.
The judgment as to that is therefore erroneous, and must
for that reason be reversed, and a new trial is ordered.
Costs to abide event.
A full discussion of the effect of cove- for example, Mickles vs. Townsend, 18
nants of warranty and conveyances upon N. Y. 575; White v8. Patten, 24 Pick.
contifigent interests, would transcend 324), a conveyance which woull not
the limits of a note. We shall only appear on an abstract nor be disclosed
attempt to examine the leading questions by the ordinary searches, would be enpresented by the facts of the principal forced against purchasers for value
case, some of which were passed upon without actual notice, and defeat a regularly deduced title.
by the Court.
The rule is, that a deed of land in fee
I. Estoppel by deed. 1. By covenants
of warranty. 2. From the relation ex- with covenants of warranty will estop
the grantor and all claiming under him
isting between the parties to the deed.
1. The doctrine of estoppel by cove- to assert a title subsequently acquired,
nantq of warranty is too well settled to as against the grantee and all claiming
be shaken, but it ought not to be ex- under him. Vanderheyden vs. Crandall,
tended farther than the principle on 2 Denio 9; 1 Comst. 41, s. c. in error;
which it rests requires. In cases which Jackson vs. Stevens, 13 Johns. 316;
might easily occur, and some of which Brown vs. McCormick, 6 Watts 60:
have found their way into the books (as White vs. Patten, 24 Pick. 324, are lead-
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ing cases on this subject. There are
similar decisions in almost every State
in the Union, which are collected in
Hare & Wallace's note to Doe vs. Oliver,
at the end of 2 Smith Lead. ,Cas. 545,
(4th Am. ed.) See also 2 Prest. Abstr.
215, 212.
Without examining these cases critically here, it is believed that the principle on which they rest is this, that
where a deed contains a direct assertion
of a fact material to the contract, it
would be inequitable to allow a party
making the assertion to deny it, as
against one who has relied upon it and
would be injured by its contradiction.
The object of the rule is to prevent circuity of action, for if the grantor could
recover by controverting his assertion
or warranty, the grantee would have a
right of action for an equal amount of
damages for its breach: 2 Prest. Abstr.
212; Jackson vs. Rubble, 1 Cow. 613;
TEAcY, Sen., in Jackson vs. Waldron, 18
Wend. 178, 207; NEL so , C. J., in Pelletreau vs. Jackson, 11 Wend. 117; Shelley vs. Wright, Willes 9; LzAoH, V. C.,
in Bensley vs. Burdon, 2 Sim. & Stu.
626.
The two leading limitations to the
rule as stated, flow naturally from the
principle on which it rests. Where the
true state of the title is apparent on the
face of the deeds containing ihe warrAnty, and under which a party claims,
the grantor is not estopped by his warranty, for it is evident that the grantee
could not have been misled. Or in the
words of COKE: "Estoppel against estoppel doth set the matter at large."
Brewster vs. Striker, 2 Comst. 19, 89;
Co. Litt. 352, b'; 2 Preston Abstr. 209;
Doe vs. Earl of Scarborough, 3 Ad. &
Ell. 2, 12, 38; Wheelock vs. Henshaw,
19 Pick. 341; Hermitage vs. Tomkins,
1 Ld. Raym. 729; Sinclair vs. Jackson,
8 Cowen 543, 586. See also Right vs.

Bucknell, 2 B. & Ad. 278 ; Pelletreau vs
Jackson, 11 Wend. 110.
The reason of the second exception to
the rule as stated, will appear when its
object-the prevention of circuity of
action-is considered. When land is
conveyed with warranty in fee, in which
the grantor is seised of a less estate,
the measure of damages on eviction
after the expiration of the estate conveyed, is the difference between its value
and the value of the fee: Tanner vs.
Livingston, 12 Wend. 83. If, therefore,
the grantor were estopped by his warranty to assert a title subsequently acquired, he would lose more than the
law would award the grantee as damages. It is, therefore, well settled that
"there can be no estoppel where an interest passes." Or, in the language of
Prof. Washburn's learned work on Real
Estate, Vol. 2, p. 476: "To bar a party
by his covenant of warranty it must
convey no title to the premises nor pass
anything upon which the covenant can
operate, for if it passes a title or interest,
the covenant does not operate as an estoppel even though it cannot operate
upon the interest to the full extent of
the intention of the parties :" 4 Kent
98; Jackson vs. Hoffman, 9 Cowen 271;
Lewis vs. Baird, 3 McLean 56, 78; Co.
Litt. 47, b; 2 Prest. Abstr. 216. The
cases cited hereafter as to estoppel between landlord and tenant are also in
point.
There is a class of cases in Massachusetts which may conveniently be classified under this latter head. Doane vs.
Willout, 5 Gray 328, and Miller vs.
Ewing, 6 Cushing 84, were grants of
land by tenants in common, with a covenant that the grantees should hold the
land conveyed "1free of all right, title,
interest, 6r claim whatever of them (the
grantors), or either of them, or of their
heirs or assigns, or of any person claim-
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ing from, by, or under them or either
of them." In Doane vs. Willcut, there
was also a recital that the grantors were
seised in fee. It was held that neither
the grantors nor their heirs were estopped to assert a subsequently acquired
title, whether derived from a third party
or from one of the grantors. The Court
considered that the covenant was satisfied by the actual seisin and estate
iwhich passed by the deeds. Such a
Covenant estops the grantor to deny that
mny interest passed by the deed. Gibbs
vs. Thayer, 6 Cushing 80. And these
cases are to be distinguished from those
in which the conveyance is, not of the
,land, but of the grantor's interest in it.
Here it is very clear that the warranty
is satisfied by the interest of the grantor
existing at the time of the execution and
delivery of the deed, and does not affect
any subsequent title: Wight vs. Shaw,
6 Cush. 56; Blanchard vs. Brooks, 12
Pick. 47.
2. Estoppels arising from the relation
of the parties to the deed. After contiderable controversy it is at last settled
that the grantee is not, as s=h, estopped
to deny his grantor's title: Blight's
Lessee vs. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 535;
Watkins vs. Holman's Lessee, 16 Peters
25, &l;Sparrow vs. Kingman, 1 Comst.
242; Averill vs. Wilson, 4 Barb. 180.
Such cases as Jackson vs. Hinman, 10
Johns. 292, are substantially overruled
by these later decisions. - The true rule
applicable to all this class of cases and
subject to the exceptions already stated,
was laid down by PARKFR, J., in Hill vs.
Hill, 4 Barb. 419. "There is no estoppcl except where the occupant is under
an obligation, express or implied, to restore the possession at some time or in
some event." So ilso, Bank of Utica
vs. Mersereau, 8 Barb. Ch. 628, 566.
And the same case limits the obligation
to the restoration of possession, and
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would allow the tenant after such restoration to assert a title hostile to the
party under whom he entered. So the
tenant is estopped to deny the landlord's
title. But the exception already stated
as to there being no estoppel where an
interest passes, is very well established
as applicable to this relation. The tenant may show as a defence, either in
ejectment or covenant, for the rent, that
the landlord's interest existing at the
the time of the lease has expired: 1
Washb. Real Est. 359; Doe vs. Seaton,
2 Cr., Mees. & Rose. 728; Franklin vs.
Carter, 1 C. B. 750; Hill vs. Saunders,
2 Bing. 112, s. o. in error, 4 B. & Cress.
529.
So it is laid down that a mortgagor is
bound to deliver possession to the mortgagee, and cannot assert a title acquired
subsequent to the mortgage: 1 Washb.
R. Est. 551 ; Barber vs. Harris, 15 Wend.
615; Doe, vs. Vickers, 4 Ad. & ElU. 782.
An exception, similar to that lastly
stated as applicable to the relation of
landlord and tenant, was applied to that
of mortgagor and mortgagee in Right
vs. Bucknell, 2 B. & Ad. 278.
This rule rests obviously on the common law doctrine that the mortgagor is
tenpant to the mortgagee.: The extent to
which it would be enforced in different
States, would obviously depend very
much upon the tendency of the jurisprudence of each to enforce the common
law strictness as to mortgages. It has
been held in New York that the mortgagor's tenant is not tenant.to the mortgagee, and can show as a defence to
ejectment by the latter, that the land
has been sold under judgments senior
to the mortgage: 6 Wend. 666, Jackson
vs. Rowland. This case is hardly reconcilable with Doe vs. Clifton, 4 Ad. & Ell.
813. There is a class of cases sometimes
cited to establish the position, that a
partition between tenants in common,

MOORE vs. LITTEL.
followed by a continuous and peaceful
possession according to the partition,
estops the parties making it to deny its
validity. But it is believed that all
.hese cases will be found on examination
to fall within two classes. In the first,
the partition was by parol of vested
interests, held under different titles by
tenants in common, and the only object
of the partition was to ascertain what
portion each should hold in severalty:
Mount v's. Morton, 20 Barb. 123; Jackson vs. Harder, 4 Johns. 202. The
other class comprises partitions by deed
with warranty, and the estoppel arising
from such transactions is in no respect
different from that raised by an ordinary
deed with warranty, and subject to similar exceptions: Brewster vs. Striker, 2
Comst. 19, 39; Doane vs. Willcut, 5 Gray
328.
II. The effect of releases upon possibilities and contingent interests. The
common law discourages conveyances
of mere rights to parties not in possession, but favors releases to tenants of
the freehold, and it was early settled
that a contingent remainder, when the
remainder-man was designated, and the
event upon which the remainder was to
vest, only was uncertain, was releasable
to the tenant of the freehold, and it came
finally to be treated as descendible, devisable, and assignable: Roe v§. Jones,
I H. IBla. 30: Wright vs. Wright, I Ves.
Sen. 409; Wilson vs. Wilson, 82 Barb.
828; Fortescue vs. Satterthwaite, 1 Ired.
N. C. 570. But where the person to
whom the remainder is limited is uncertain, any one in whom it might possibly
vest thereafter is said to have a naked
possibility only without any interest.
Whether such a possibility can be re!eased even to the tenant of the freehold
is at least a doubtful question: Lampet's
Case, 10 Rep. 51, a, is explicit that it
cannot. Most of the cases have arisen

under devises to the survivor of two or
more. One joint tenant could always
release to his co-tenant, (per Mitter restate, as the phrase was), so as to vest
the entire fee in the latter. Yet in fact,
he has but an estate for the joint lives
with the possibility of survivorship.
And there would seem to be no good
reason why a party should not be able
to release the possibility of survivorship
when it is limited by express words as
well as when it arises by construction
from words of conveyance in joint tenancy. On these two points Miller vs.
Emans, 19 N. Y. 385, was decided. The
words of the devise in that case we e
construed to create a contingent joint
tenancy, and a release by four of the
tenants to their co-tenants in possession
of the freehold was held to pass the
possibility of the releasors' survivorship,
and to enlarge the estate of the releasees.
In both respects Miller vs. Emans is distinguishable from the second class of
cases under the Medcef Eden will : Pelletreau vs. Jackson, 11 Wend. 110, s. c.
in error, sub nom. Jackson vs. Waldron,
13 Wend. 178, 196. It is believed that
these cases will yet be harmonised on
the principle suggested, on which Chancellor WALWORTH based his dissenting
opinion: 13 Wend. 195.
However this may be, it would seem
to be well settled that a possibility 'iithout an interest cannot at law be released
or assigned to a stranger: 3 Prest.
Abstr. 5, 6; 2 Id. 95, 96, 205; Doe vs.
Tomkinson, 2 Maule & Sel. 165; 4 Kent
260; 4 Cruise Dig. 303, tit. 32, ch. 23,
1I; Nicoll vs. N. Y. & Erie Railroad,
12 N. Y. (2 Kern.) 121 ; Jackson vs
Catlin, 2 Johns. 248,261; and Lampet'e
Case and the Medcef Eden Cases already
cited.
When i remainder, as in the principal
case, is conveyed or devised to the heirs
of a person yet living, the heir apparant
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has such a naked possibility only: 4
Kent 207; Fearne on Remainders 871;
Campbell vs. Rawdon, 18 N.'Y. 412; 1
18, 83, pp.
Hilliard Real Est. oh. 41,
515, 517 (3d ed.), and the cases lastly
cited.
This will be seen even more clearly
by an allusion to the doctrine of abeyance. Fearne, it will be remembered,
maintained that the fee was never in
abeyance, but, in case of a feoffment
with livery to A. for life, remainder in
contingency, remained in the feoffor
until the remainder vested. Preston,
Cornish, Kent, and the other text-writers
who controvert this position, agree that
the fee does not pass, even in case of a
feoffiment, to the contingent remaindermen, and the authorities are uniform
that in conveyances deriving their effect
from the Statute of Uses, "if the use of
the fee be limited in contingency, the
fee will result to the grantor till it can
vest." And it will descend to his heirs:
2 Preston Abstr. 83, 99; Fearne on
Remainders 528: 4 Kent 257: Greenleaf's note to 2 Cruise 330, tit. 16, ch. 8,
2. And grants are assimilated to conveyances to uses: 4 Cruise 52, tit. 82,
oh. 4, 41-44.
If, therefore, the fee is in the grantor
and descends to his heirs, it is difficult
to see how a conveyance by a person
who may possibly acquire it subsequently can affect it, other than by
way of estoppel, or contract to convey.
III. The assignability in equity of
possibilities and contingent interests.
On this subject there are conflicting authorities. On the one hand Lord ELDoN
declares, in Carleton vs. Leighton, 8
Meriv. 667, that the expectancy of an
heir presumptive is not capable of being
made the subject of a contract. It is

to be observed, however, that the case
did not call for such a remark. An assignment in bankruptcy was decided not
to pass such an expectancy. On the
other hand Judge STOny, 2 Eq. Jur.
1040, c, d, says that contingent interests
and expectancies may be assigned in
equity. See, however,
1021, and 4
Kent 144. It is believed that whenever
such an assignment has been enforced
it has been as a contract to convey; and
that all possibilities, whether coupled
with an interest or not, may be made
the subject of such a contract. But the
party claiming under it must aver and
prove that he bargained and paid for
that precise interest or possibility, for
an adequate and valuable consideration
in good faith: Varick vs. Edwards, 5
Denio 664, 690; 1 Powell Mortg. 17, 18;
Pope vs. Whitcombe, 8 Russell 124;
Whitfield vs. Fausset, 1 Ves. Sen. 887 ;
Trull vs. Eastman, 3 Met. 121; Harwood vs. Tooke, 2 Simons 192; Beckley
vs. Newland, 2 P. Wins. 182. It is to
be observed, however, that personalty
was the subject of the contract in the
two latter cases.
How far this doctrine is modified by
such statutes as that of New York,
quoted in Judge LOTT'S opinion, remains
to be ascertained by judicial decision.
It may be maintained with plausibility,
at least, that possibilities are not estates
and so not included in the terms of the
statute, and that estates in possession
are not alienable by those who have no
interest in them. But it is not proposed
to enter into a criticism upon the principal case, for similar questions, arising
under the same title, will probably soon
come before the New York Court of Ap.
peals.
E. P. W.
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Supreme Judicial Court of New -Hampsire.
DAVID F. BROWN VS. JAMES SIMONS et aZ.
Where the mortgagor's assignee offered to pay the mortgage-debt, at the same
time producing the money in a pocket-book, a part of which was in bank notes,
and the holder of the mortgage refused to receive it, without making any objection to the amount or kind of money: held, that further proceedings were dispensed with, and that the tender was valid.
A mortgagee in possession and taking the rents and profits, can acquire no title
against the mortgagor or his assignee, by a purchase of the land at a collector's
sale for the taxes upon it; but he may add the sum paid for such taxes, to the
mortgage-debt as expenses necessarily incurred in protecting the estate.
Where the mortgagor sells portions of the land at different times, that which he
retains will, in equity, be held primarily liable for the whole debt; and if not
sufficient, the several parcels sold will be liable in the inverse order of such
sales, beginning with the 'parcel last sold.
Provided however, that the previous conveyances not registered, are subject to be
postponed to subsequent registered conveyances.
The release by the mortgagee of a portion of theland mortgaged with the knowledge
of a prior sale of another portion, will operate as to such prior purchaser as a
discharge pro tanto of the mortgage-debt.

This is a bill in equity, alleging the purchase by Samuel Andrews of George W. Thayer, of a considerable tract of land in
Manchester, valuable for building lots, on the 17th day of October,
1855, and a mortgage back on the same day to secure the payment of the price; that the land was afterwards by said Andrews
cut up into house lots, and the greater part sold at various- times
to different persons, and amongst others, one lot was sold to Otis
Chamberlain, November 5th, 1856, and by him to the plaintiff,
who now holds the same.
That some of the deeds were recorded soon after they were
given, and others not until subsequent conveyances were made and
registered.
That among these conveyances by said Andrews was one to A.
P. Jefts of a large tract, of' which said Thayer, then holding said
mortgage, gave a release.
The bill further alleges that the mortgage is still outstanding,
and that the holder has made attempts to foreclose it upon the
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whole property; whereas the parcels still retained by the mortgagor, and those sold by him since the sale to the plaintiff's
grantor, are, as alleged by the bill, of value sufficient to satisfy
and discharge the entire mortgage-debt; and the plaintiff claims
that the holder of the mortgage should first be required to make
application of those parcels before having recourse to the lot held
by the plaintiff.
The bill also states that Thayer, on December 28th, 1858, took
possession of the mortgaged property for the purpose of foreclosing the mortgage, and afterwards, before September 1st, 1859,
assigned the mortgage to the defendant Simons, and that in the
fall of that year the plaintiff called upon Simons, produced the
money, and offered to pay the entire mortgage-debt, but that
Simons refused to receive it.
The plaintiff also offers to pay the amount now due on the mortgage, and also prays that a receiver may be appointed to sell the
lands retained by said Andrews, and those sold by him since the
sale, to plaintiff's grantor, and apply the avails thereof to the payment of said mortgage-debt, and for such other and further relief
as his case may require.
The answers of Simons and sundry others who were grantees
of said Andrews, admit the conveyances as stated in the bill, but
Simons denies that the lands retained by Andrews, and those sold
since the conveyance to plaintiff's grantor, are of sufficient value
to pay the entire mortgage-debt-and denies that plaintiff offered
to pay such debt, as stated in the bill, but claims that the mortgage
has been duly and legally foreclosed upon the whole of the land.
The answer also alleges that on the 15th day of January, 1859,
a large portion of the mortgaged premises, including the plaintiff's
lot, was sold by the collector of Manchester for the taxes of 1858,
to the said Thayer, and the tax not having been paid within the
year, the land was at the expiration thereof conveyed to him; and
afterwards, on the 17th day of February, 1860, was by him conveyed to the said Simons, who now alleges himself to be the owner
of the lot claimed by the plaintiff.
The answer of Otis Chamberlain, the plaintiff's grantor, alleges
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that at the time of the conveyance to him he had no knowledge,
information, or suspicion of any incumbrance upon the lands; and
the answer of A. P. Jefts, one of said Andrews's grantees, states
that when Thayer assigned his mortgage to Simons, he informed
him that he had before released to said Jefts his claim by virtue
of the mortgage upon the parcel sold to Jefts by Andrews.
The case was heard upon the bill, answers, and proofs, and all
further essential facts appear in the opinion of the Court.
S.

. Bell, for plaintiff.
. C. & S CG.Clarke, for Simons.

The opinion of the Court was delivered by
BELLOWS, J.-The denial in the answer of Simons of an offer
to pay the amount of the Thayer mortgage is, we think, overcome
by the testimony of the plaintiff and Isaac W. Fogg, which sustains the allegations in the bill.
From their, statements it appears that the plaintiff, in the presence of Fogg, met the defendant Simons on the 27th day of
December, 1859, and proposed to pay him the amount of the
Thayer mortgage, and take an assignment of it; that Simons
declined the proposal, and the plaintiff then proposed to pay it
without any assignment, and took out his pocket-book and offered
to pay it, he having, as he testifies, the money with him for that
purpose; that Simons then said that this was no place to pay the
mbney, it being out of doors and windy; and thereupon the plaintiff proposed' to go to Simons's boarding-place near by and pay it,
but Simons declined, and said he should not take the money until
he had seen his brother; and according to Fogg's account, on the
plaintiff's asking Simons if he refused to take the money, he said
he would not take it anyway.
The weight of the evidence then is that the plaintiff bad the
money with him, took it out of his pocket, and offered to pay
Simons the amount of the Thayer mortgage, without any conditions, and that Simons refused to take it, without making
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any objection to the amount, or that the money was chiefly in bank
notes.
The answer of Simons denies any offer to pay, but admits a
conversation about redeeming the mortgage, and says it was
agreed to go to Manchester and see further about it. We think,
however, that the weight of the evidence is against him on that
point, and sustains the bill.
Under these circumstances we think a further offer of the
money was dispensed with, and that a valid tender was made : 2
Greenl. Ev. § 603, and note 1 and cases cited; Bazard vs. Loring
et al., 10 Cush. 267; Parkervs. Perkins, 8 Id. 319 ; and Sergeant
vs. Graham, 5 N. 11. 440, and cases cited; and we also think that
all objection to the character of the money was waived: Cummings vs. Putnam, 19 N. H. 569.
Assuming, therefore, that the money is ready in Court for the
defendant Simons, as set forth in the amendment, the plaintiff bas
shown a title to redeem unless it be defeated by the sale for taxes
set up in Simons's answer. Upon that point it appears that on
December 28th, 1858, Thayer entered into possession of the land
under process for the purpose of foreclosing the mortgage; and
January 15th, 1859, the collector of taxes sold a part of the mortgaged premises, including plaintiff's lot, to Thayer for the taxes
of 1858, and not having been redeemed within the year, the said
Thayer conveyed the same to Simons, to whom he had previously,
on the 28d day of May, 1839, assigned the mortgage.
So that at the time of the sale and payment of the money for
the taxes, Thayer was himself the holder of the mortgage, and in
possession under it, although the taxes were assessed in April
previous, and consequently before Thayer's entry.
The payment then was necessary to protect the estate, and the
amount paid might unquestionably have been added to the mortgage-debt, as expenses necessarily incurred by the mortgagee to
protect the estate: Godfrey vs. Fatson, 8 Atk. 518; Washburn
on Real Property 583, and cases cited; Mix vs. Hotchkiss, 14
Conn. 32; Williams vs. Hilton, 35 Maine 354; Page vs. Poste?,
7 N. H. 392; Kortright vs. Cady, 23 Barb. 497.
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In fact, the mortgagee in possession holds the estate with duties
and obligations analogous to those of a trustee, and is bound to
make necessary repairs. Indeed, by the entry and taking possession, he assumes the duties of a provident owner, and, in the
nature of a bailiff to the mortgagee, is subject to an account for
the profits: Powell on Mortgages 464; 4 Kent's Com. 167;
.fughes vs. Williams, 12 Yes. 493, note a; Hunt vs. Maynard,
6 Pick. 491.
It is accordingly held that if such mortgagee procure the grant
of a new term, after the expiration of the old one, it will be in
trust for the mortgagor, and redeemed with the principal: Powell
on Mort. 97, 98, and cases; 4 Kent's Com. 167.
So, if he assign his mortgage to an insolvent person, he will be
bound to answer for the profits still, for it is a breach of trust to
assign such pledge to an insolvent person: 3 Bacon's Abr. 658;
Powell on Mort. 467, and cases cited.
Upon these principles we think that Thayer could acquire no
title to the property mortgaged, or any part of it, by the purchase
at the tax sale, while he was in possession and taking the rents
and profits; but we think it was clearly his duty to pay such taxes,
and add the amount to the mortgage-debt.
The bill sets out that a portion of the mortgaged land.is still
held by the mortgagor, and that other portions were sold by him
after the sale to Otis Chamberlain, under which the plaintiff claims,
and that these lands are sufficient to pay off the entire mortgagedebt, without touching the tract claimed by the plaintiff; and the
bill prays that those lands may be sold by a receiver, and the proceeds applied to extinguish the mortgage; -and also prays for
general relief.
And the question is, whether the lands retained by the mortgagor, and those sold since the conveyance under which the plain.
tiff claims, ought first to be applied to the discharge of the
mortgage.
In respect to that which the mortgagor, still retains, the law is
well settled that it stands primarily liable for the payment of the
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wkole debt, while that which he has sold is chargeable only fox
the deficiency after the other has been applied.
In principle it is much like the case where one creditor has
security upon two funds, and another creditor upon one of them
only; and there a Court of Equity is constantly in the habit of
decreeing that the first incumbrancer shall look first to the fund
on which the other has no lien.
If a mortgagor who had sold a part of the property should
himself pay the whole debt, it is quite clear that he could not call
upon his grantee for contribution, for he has merely paid his own
debt. Nor could any one standing in his place as the heir, or
person purchasing merely the equity of redemption, call for such
contribution.
In the case of the sale by the mortgagor, of all the mortgaged
property to different purchasers at the same time, their equities
must be regarded as equal, and each must contribute rateably to
the discharge of the common burthen; but if such conveyances
are at different times, their equities, though equal as respects the
mortgagor, are not equal as respects each other-because as the
land last conveyed, while in the hands of the mortgagor, was primarily liable for the whole debt, it is not equitable that its character should be changed, and the charge upon it diminished by a
subsequent conveyance; and besides, if the equities were to be regarded as equal, that of the first purchaser is prior in point of
times and neither having the legal title, the maxim u'i prior est in
tempore, potiorest injure must apply. This doctrine is established,
we think, by a great preponderance of authority: Washburn on
Real Property 570, and cases cited; 4 Kent's Cor. 179, notes a
and 1 ; Clowes vs. Dickinson, 5 Johns. Oh. 240; Jame8 vs. Hubbard, 1 Paige Oh. Rep. 234; 7enkllns vs. .Freyer,4 Id. 53; Guion
vs. Knapp, 6 Id. 35 ; Patty vs. Pease, 8 Id. 277 ; Skiel vs. Sprakcer, 8 Id. 195 ; Schryver et al. vs. Teller et al., 9 Id. 173 ; Howard
vs. Halsey, 4 Sandf. 565; La .Farge Ins. Co. vs. Bell, 22 Barb.
34; Gates vs. Adams et al., 24 Vt. 71; Ohase vs. Woodbury,
6 Cush. 143; Blake vs. Morse, 3 Halst. Oh. "509; Shannon vs.
Marselis, 1 Saxton N. J. Oh. Rep. 413, 421; Henklee vs. Allstadat,
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4 Gratt. 284 ; Jones vs. Ayrice, 8 Gratt. 179 ; Britton vs. Updike,
2 Green. Ch. Rep. 125; Wickoff vs. Davis, 3 Id. 224; Hilliard on
Mort. 237, and cases cited.
It is true that doubts of this doctrine are expressed by Mr.
Justice STORY, in 2 El. Jur., § 1233, and a different rule seems
to have been adopted by the Vice-Chancellor in Barnes vs. .acster, 1 Younge & Coll. 406, and it is held otherwise in Kentucky,
Dilcey vs. Thompson, 8 B. Mon. 312. Yet we think the weight
of authority is strongly in favor of the rule we have stated, and
we think that upon principle the last purchaser cannot be regarded
as standing upon the same ground as the first.
In Hartly vs. O'Plaerty,Lloyd & G., Cases temp. Plunket 216,
Lord PLUNKET holds that "cif a mortgagor sells a portion of his
equity of redemption for valuable or good consideration, the entire residue undisposed of by him is applicable, in the first instance, to the discharge of the mortgage, and in ease of the bond
fide purchaser; and it is contrary to any principle of justice to
say that a person afterwards purchasing from that mortgagor shall
be in a better situation than the mortgagor himself in respect to
any of his rights.'"
If, however, at the time of the subsequent conveyance by the
mortgagor, the grantee has no notice of the prior conveyance, in
fact, or constructively (the same not having been registered), such
subsequent grantee ought not to take the land so granted, subject
primarily to the whole debt; on the contrary, as the prior grantee
has failed to record his deed, and thus give notice of the true state
of the title, the subsequent grantee, unless otherwise notified, may
rightfully regard the land which is thus apparently in the hands
of the mortgagor, as primarily liable for the whole debt.
It is true that the first grant by the mortgagor of a part of the
property, does not, in terms, impose a lien upon what is left; .but
in effect it creates upoi it, as between the parties, a new incumbrance, and makes it liable, primarily, for the whole debt, as much
as if such mortgagor had mortgaged it to such purchaser to indemnify him against the original mortgage.
It makes a case, then, that clearly comes within the spirit of
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our Statute of Enrolments, which is designed for the security of
subsequent purchasers and creditors, to give notice of all conveyances of any estate in lands, whether legal or equitable: 1 Story's
Eq. Jur. § 403; Parkest vs. Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. Rep. 398;
4 Greenl. Cruise's Dig. 448-452, and notes; General _Ti8. Co. vs.
UT.S. .ns. Co., 10 Md. 517; Brush vs. Weare, 15 Pet. 113.
The Middlesex Register Act, which requires to be enrolled cc tll
deeds and conveyances," was held to extend to every species of
deed or instrument by which lands may be cohveyed or affected;
and therefore an appointment under 6 power is considered as a
conveyance within the register acts: 4 Greenl. Cruise's Dig. 448;
Serafton vs. Quincy, 2 Yes. Sen. 413. In that casd it was contended that this deed was not a separate conveyance, but only the
execution of a power under. a deed that was registered; but the
Court held that if this construction was to prevaml, there wduld be
an end of the registry law, for by this means a secret deed might
be get up to defeat him who had registered before: and the Court
say the case is dlearly within the migchief recited,' which is to"
prevent a party fr6m being defeated by a secret or pocket deed.
In Brush vs. "Weare, before cited, the Court, in discussing the
general doctrine of notice, lays it down that " no principle is better established than that a purchaser must look to every part of
the title which is essential to its validity."
And, again, it is laid down in the same case, that "the law requires reasonable diligence in a purchaser to ascertain any defect
of title. But when such defect is brought to his knowledge, no
inconvenience will excuse him from the utmost scrutiny."
In accordance with such views, it was held in Reeder et al. vs.
Barret al., 4 Ohio 458, that where a p9tent was issued to Newell,
the assignee of Hensot, Reeder's administrator, a subiequent purchaser was charged with notice of the equitable fights of the heirs
of Reeder, because, by the laws of Ohio, an administrator has no
power, unless iuthorized- by the Court ot Common Pleas to convey an interest in land. So in Brush vs. Weare, it was held that
as the executor had no power of sale, unless given him by the
will, the purchaser was bound to look into the will and see if such
VOL. XIL-11
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power was given. See also Backman vs. Chiarlestown, 42 N. It
134. If the first conveyance by the mortgagor after the mort*
gage, is duly registered by the grantee, he has done all that he
can do to give notice of the new burthen that is thereby thrown
upon the part which is retained by the mortgagor; and a second
purchaser, charged as he clearly is with notice of the mortgage
upon the whole land when the deed is registered, and knowing that
the extent of the burthen upon his own purchase must depend
upon the fact of there having been a prior conveyance by the
mortgagor, would, upon due inquiry, and in the exercise of reasonable diligence, be led by the record to a knowledge of the true
state of the title, and the extent of the incumbrance upon the
land conveyed to him. This he is directly interested to know, and.
the first purchaser has placed the means of knowledge reasonably
within his reach, and it is his own fault if he neglects to avail
himself of it.
In the examination of the title to the part he proposes to buy,
he is led directly to the original mortgage, and he finds that his is
but part of an entire tract in which his grantor has only a right
of redemption, and which was originally subject to a common burthen, but liable to be affected by a prior sale of another part of
the entire tract.
Under such circumstances, the different parcels of the tract
mortgaged cannot, we think, be regarded as separate and distinct,
so as to relieve him of the duty to inquire into the title to the
other part; but we think* that, in examining the title to the part
he proposes to buy, he is led directly to a deed that puts him on
inquiry as to the remaining part of the land: 2 Fonbl. Equity, B.
8, Ch. 8, s. 1, note; 4 Greenl. Cruise Dig. 452, note; Parkest vs.
Alexander, 1 Johns. Ch. 398. In accordance with these views is
the doctrine of Chase vs. Woodbury, 6 Cush. 143, where a mortgagor conveyed the whole of the mortgaged property to S. & R.,
to each an undivided half; and S., having recorded- his deed, conveyed his half to C. before the deed to R. was registered ; and,
upon the payment by the representative of R. of the whole mortgage-debt, it was held that he could not require contribution of
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C., because C. had purchased without any notice of the sale to R.,
and might therefore rely upon the other half, being first holden
for the whole'debt; although, had the deed to R. been recorded,
it would have been notice of a lien on the land sold to S. equally
with the other; but the failure to record it was a failure of one
claiming an incumbrance, to wit, a lien on the estate for a contribution for one-half of the money he might pay to redeem it; and
this, the Court held, stood upon the same footing as if R. had a
mortgage from the first grantor, which he had failed to record.
The result of this case is, that a party purchasing a part of an
estate under mortgage, would be charged with notice of a registered conveyance of another part, when the effect would be to
render his part so purchased liable to contribution equally with the
other-and for the same rdason he would be charged with such
.notice in a case where the effect would be to make his purchase
primarily liable for the whole debt. The case of Chase vs. Woodbury is directly in point, and fully sustains the views we have expressed.
It is true, it has been suggested that this right to have first
applied the lands remaining in the mortgagor's hands and those
last sold is a mere equity, and not a lien or incumbrance that
comes within the provisions of the register laws-and so it is
directly held in -Ellisonvs. Pecare et al., 29 Barb. 333, and therefore it was decided that the deed first delivered would take precedence over a subsequent deed of another parcel, although the
latter was first recorded.
In this case, however, it appeared that neither of these purchasers had knowledge of the original mortgage at the time of
their purchase; and the Court expressly decline to give an opinion
as to the result, had the second purchaser known of the existence
of the mortgage, and had examined the records, and, finding no
previous conveyance, had been induced to buy, supposing in good
faith that he was the first purchaser; in which case, it is said,
there would be some show of equity in favor of the second purchaser.
In the case of La Farge Fire Ins. Co. vs. Bell, 22 Barb. 54, it
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was held, upon much consideration, that the Register Act, which
provides that " every conveyance not recorded shall be void against
a subsequent purchaser in good faith of the same real estate, or
any portion thereof, whose conveyance shall first be duly recorded,'
does apply to the equitable right which is acquired by a purchaser of a parcel of the mortgaged property, to have the residue
first applied to the payment of the mortgage-debt, and that such
equitable right will not be defeated by a prior conveyance of that
residue, unless it be by deed duly recorded, or other notice, at the
time of his purchase-and the reasons assigned for this doctrine
are in no degree shaken by the subsequent case of Ellison vs.
Pecare,which appears to have been decided without any examination of the case of In8. Co. vs. Bell.
Indeed, it is difficult to see how any other result can be reached.
The deed of a parcel of the tract mortgaged carries with it a wellestablished right to require the mortgagee first to exhaust the
residue in the bands of the mortgagor before applying the parcel
so conveyed; and whether this right'can be enforced only in equity
or not, it is clearly a substantial interest in such residue, and one
which it is the policy of the registry laws io protect. See Montgomery vs. .Dorion, 6 N. H. 255; Frenchvs. Gray, 2 Conn. 108;
4 Kent's Com. 456; Brown vs. Manter, 22 N. H. 468.
Our opinion therefore is, that the plaintiff has still the right to
redeem the mortgage held by the defendant, Simons, as the assignee of Thayer.
That the purchase, by Thayer, at the tax sale, cannot be set up
against the title of the mortgagor, and that the lands still retained
by the mortgagor shall first be applied to the discharge of the
mortgage; and if not sufficient, that the parcels sold by him shall
be applied in the inverse order of the times of such sales, beginning with the parcel last sold-provided, however, that previous
sales not registered are subject to be postponed to subsequent registered conveyances, upon the principles before stated.
And we are also of the opinion that a release by the mortgagee
of a part of the land, with notice of the sale to plaintiff's grantor,
will operate, as to the plaintiff, as a discharge pro tanto: Guion
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vs. Knapp, 6 Paige Oh. Rep. 43; Patty vs. Pease, 8 Id. 285;
Ins. Co. vs. Bell, 22 Barb. 54; 1 Washburne on Real Property
572, and cases cited; Taylor vs. Maris, 5 Rawle Rep. 51 ; and
these cases go to the point that without such. notice such release
will not be a discharge.
We are indebted to the courtesy of
Mr. Justice BELLOWS for the foregoing
opinion, in which it is but justice to say
that a very interesting and important
question is very carefully considered.
It is not a little surprising to us, that a
proposition which seems to rest upon
principles so obvious, and at the same
time so simple and elementary, should
have encountered so much doubt and
hesitation in regard to its acceptance
and application.
Ever since the time of Harbert's Case,
8 Co. Rep. 11, it seems to have been
regarded as clear law, that if an incumbrance rests upon three acres, and one
be sold to A., and another to B., and the
third descends to the heir, who discharges the incumbrance, he will not be
entitled to contribution from A. and B.,
"for he sits in the seat of his ancestor."
This general principle runs through
all the English cases in equity, where
any such question has been raised.
Lord EaDON, Chancellor, argues it at
considerable length in Aldrich vs. Cooper, 8 Vesey 882, 395, but not without
something of his lordship's usual hesitation. It seems to be based upon the*
familiar doctrine, that where two claimants stand in equal equity, except that
one may go against either of two or
more securities or funds, while the other
has not the right to go against them all,
the former will be decreed in equity
first to exhaust the security against
which the other has no claim. This is
a rule of equity jurisprudence too long
established and too familiar to require
the support of authority: Macreth vs.

Symmons, 15 Vesey 329; Rimmer vs.
Bayne, 9 Vesey 209, where the rule is
stated and explained; and the early
cases cited and reviewed by two of the
most eminent of the English equity
judges, Lord ELDON and Sir WILLAM
GRANT.

The only question which has ever
been made in regard to the point, is
whether the rule has any just and proper
application to the case of successive
purchasers of portions of the equity of
redemption. The weight of authority,
both in England knd America, seems to
be decidedly in favor of the opinion that
it is precisely applicable to cases of that
character. In the case of Averall vs.
Wade, Lloyd & Gould 252, Lord ST.
LEONARDS, then Chancellor of Ireland,

reviews the cases at length, and comes
to the conclusion that a judgment lien.
under similar circumstances, rests upon
the portion of the land retained longest
by the debtor, and that the portions first
sold are exonerated in the order of the
conveyances. Lord PLUNKET, Chancellor of Ireland, had recognised the
same rule in an early case, and Lord
REDESDALE, while Chancellor of Ireland, ini the case of Hamilton vs. Royse,
2 Sch. & Lef. 315, held "that the rule
is very clear. A purchaser takes subject
to all the equities to which the vendor
was subject, and of which the purchaser
has notice." The same principle is recognised and carried to its extreme
verge, in Greenwood vs. Taylor, I Ruse.
& Ry. 185.
This subject is elaborately discussed
in the American notes to Aldrich vs.
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Cooper, 2 Lead. Eq. Cas. 217, by Messrs. incumbrancer may be subrogated to h
Hare and Wallace, and with the same rights, and thus obtain the benefit of the
conclusion. The doctrine seems to be same equity.
recognised in most of the American
2. Where the purchaser of a portion
States where this precise point has been of the mortgaged premises is still owing
made, most of which are referred to by the mortgagor for the purchase-money,
the learned judge in the preceding especially when it is secured by way of
mortgage or lien upon the land, he has
opinion.
The only difficulty in regard to the no such perfected equity as will enable
rule is that it admits of many excep- him to require the mortgagee to go extions and qualifications, which require clusively against the other portion of
some degree of watchfulness, lest it be the security. For if he is compelled to
so applied as to produce injustice.
pay all or a portion of the incumbrance,
. 1. It is sometimes made a question to relieve his portion of the land, he
whether the contract of the mortgagee will be subrogated to the rights of the
can be so far qualified, by subsequent mortgagee, and by that means, and the
negotiations of the mortgagor with third unpaid purchase-money, it will be fully
persons, with whom the mortgagee has in the power of a court of equity to
no privity, as to require him to take protect him in all his equitable rights:
his satisfaction out of a portion of the Allen vs. Clark, 17 Pick. R. 47.
premises, when his contract extended
3. So also where the purchaser of a
equally over the whole. And many portion of the land takes it subject to
cases have refused to make even an ap- the incumbrance, making it his own
portionment of the mortgage-money debt, he acquires no equity against the
among different.parts of the land sold mortgagee superior to that of the mortto different persons, upon the ground gagor, since he merely steps into his
that it tended to abridge the remedy of place.
the mortgagee. This is true to a certain
4. So, too, the purchaser of a portion
extent. The mortgagee cannot be re- of the ]and has no claim to compel the
quired to apportion his security, or go mortgagee to go against the mortgagor,
exclusively against a portion of his in- upon his personal obligation to pay the
demnity, if he will be liable thereby to money due, before resorting to the land,
render his security less available for the since the rule was never construed to
enforcement of the payment of his debt. extend so far as to require the mortgagee
Bqt in such case, the subsequent inoum- to relinquish his entire claim upon the
brancer must pay the amount due the land, and thus deprive himself wholly
first incumbrancer, and be subrogated of all benefit of a portion of his entire
to his rights, and thus be enabled to securities, for the benefit of subsequent
enforce the collection against that por- incumbrancers: Cherry vs. Monro, 2
tion of the security against which he Barb. Ch. R. 618.
had before no lien. The rule therefore
6. There are doubtless many other
need% this qualification, that the first qualifications of the rule, one important
incumbrancer is only required to go one of which is discussed in the princiagainst the fund not covered by the pal opinion, that the equities of the
subsequent incumbrance, when that can successive purchasers of portions of the
be done without abridging his security. land depend upon notice of all the prior
Where that will be the result, the second sales having come, either expressly or
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constructively, to each subsequent purchaser.
With these and other necessary qualifications, it seems clear that the equitable rule that each prior purchaser of a
portion of the land mortgaged at its full
vaiue, with a covenant or contract, express or implied, for indemnity against
the whole mortgage resting upon the
land so purchased, may claim, in a
court of equity, that the mortgagee be
decreed first to exhaust his remedy
against the land remaining in the mortgagor at the time of his purchase, so far
as that can be done without impairing
essentiallythe efficiency of the security,
and that where that cannot be effected
without such impairment of the security,
it will be transferred to the subsequent
incumbrancer, by way of subrogation,
upon the payment of the amount due
the first incumbrancer. And as a necessary corollary of this doctrine, if the
mortgagee release a portion of the land
after he has notice, either express or
constructive, of the transfer of any
portion of'the land by the mortgagor,
it is, as to such purchaser, a release of
his security po tanto. This rule seems
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to have been adopted in New York,
Skeel vs. Spraker, 8 Paige 195 Patty
vs. Pease, Id. 277; in Vermont, Lyman
vs. Lyman, 82 Vt. R. 79; in Maine,
Sheperd vs. Adams, 32 Maine R. 63; in
Massachusetts, Chase v. Woodbury, 6
Cush. R. 148; in Georgia, Carter vs.
Neal, 24 Ga. R. 346; in New Jersey.
Shannon vs. Marselis, I Saxton N. J.
Ch. R. 418, 421; and there are doubtless others. In Iowa, in Bates vs.
Ruddick, 2 Clark 423, it seems to be
considered that while equity requires
the land in the hands of the vendor to
be first charged, the same equity does
not extend to the purchaser of the later
portions of the land. This is certainly
a misapprehension. For if the land in
the hands of the mortgagor is first
chargeable, of which there is no reasonable ground to doubt, it seems to us.impossible to relieve it from that prior
lien by transferring it to a third party,
with full notice of all the facts. This.
would be at variance with the whole
system of equity law. We might pursue the question further, but we forbear
I. F. R.

In the New York Court of Appeas.
IIENRY RAWLS, RESPONDENT, V8. THE AMERICAN MUTUAL LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANTS.
Where a creditor of F. had insured his life for a sum not exceeding his debt, and
before F.'s death, the cause of action upon the debt was barred by the Statute
of Limitations: Hdd, in an action by the insured against the insurance company, that he was entitled to recover.
In such a case, the debt still exists and is not extinguished as in the case of payment.
In a contract of life insurance, it is enough that the party effecting the policy has
an insurable interest at its inception, and it is not required that the interest
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should continue and exist at the time of the death of the person whose life is
insured, to entitle the holder of the policy to recover. Per W IHT, J.
The rules of the defendant required the applicant for insurance to furnish a reference to some third person, from whom information might be obtained respecting
the health and habits of the person whose life was to be insured. Held, under
the circumstances of the case, that the statement of the third person could not
be regarded as a warranty.
Where a series of questions is put to the insured and fully answered, an omission
to state matter not called for by any general or specific question, is not a concealmept, and will not affect the validity of the policy.
The following propositions, among others, in the law of evidence, decided:
1. Statements by the debtor made after the insurance is effected are not admissible
in evidence against the insured.
2. Experts cannot be examined as to the point whether a person who is in the
habitual use of intoxicating drinks can be regarded as an insurable subject.
8. When the defendant puts in issue in the pleadings, the good faith of the author
of a written statement upon which the policy is issued, it is proper for the
plaintiff to ask such person if his answers to questions contained in the statement were made in good faith.

This action was upon a policy of insurance issued by the defendants; dated the 28th day of July, 1853, for $5000, on the
life of John L. Fish, of Rochester, New York, payable to the
plaintiff.
The answer of the defendants alleged that Fish
did not perform
and comply with all the conditions of the policy to be performed
and complied with by him, and did many acts and things prohi.
bited by the terms of the policy. Also, that the plaintiff had not
made proof in the manner provided in the conditions -annexed to
the policy, of the death of Fish, and that such pretended proofs
omitted to state truly the cause of his death. Also, that the statements and representations made to defendant by plaintiff respecting the life, health, &c., of Fish, presented to the defendant before
issuing the policy, and in consideration of which the policy was
issued, were false and untrue.
On the trial, the defendants, on the call of the plaintiff, produced, and the plaintiff put in evidence the proofs of loss furnished
to the defendants, and proved that such proofs were delivered to
the defendants in March, 1857. Plaintiff also proved that on the
28th day of May, 1850, Fish and one Holmes, as partners, wero
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indebted to the firm of Read & Rawls, of which plaintiff was a
member, in the sum of $9675.73, and that no part of the debt

had been paid.
The plaintiff then rested, and defendants moved for a nonsuit,
which was denied, and the defendants excepted.
The defendants then offered and read in evidence the statements
of Fish, Shipman and Marsh, and adduced testimony for the purpose of showing that, prior to the application for the policy in
suit, July, 1853, Fish was of intemperate habits. The plaintiff
adduced testimony tending to show that Fish was not of intemperate habits when the policy in suit was applied for.
The Court then charged the jury, to portions of which charge
the counsel for the defendants excepted. The following question
was submitted to the jury for their answer :"Question.-Was John L. Fish, on the 16th of July, 1853, to
the knowiedge of Mr. Marsh, in the habit of intemperate drinking
to such an extent as had or would, in the opinion of Mr. Marsh,
impair his constitution or general health?"
The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $6081.57, and
answered the question submitted to them as follows:,The jury think the statement iade by Mr. Marsh, on the 16th
of July, 1853, was truthfully made, according to the best of his
knowledge."
On this verdict judgment was perfected for the- plaintiff for
$6739.34, February 7th, 1861: (fol. 45).
The defendant appealed therefrom to the General Term, on the
14th March, 1861. In March, 1862, the General Term rendered
judgment of affirmance, from which the defendant appealed to
this Court: (fols. 276-284).
Lucien Birdeye, for plaintif.
Benedict and .Boardman, for defendants.
Cause submitted upon printed arguments.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
WRIGHT, J.-The defendants in form contracted with Fish for
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an insurance upon his life. In consideration of certain statements
and representations made, and of a premium of $117 to be paid
annually in advance, the defendants promised and agreed with
Fish, his heirs or other legal representatives, to pay the sum of
$5000 to the plaintiff within ninety days after proof of the death
of Fish, provided the policy should then be in force. If this is to
be regarded and treated as a contract with Fish to insure his own
life, then the question attempted to be raised on the motion for a
nonsuit, viz., That the plaintiff had no insurable interest in the
life of Fish, and hence that it was a gaming or wagering policy,
cannot arise. If the contract is with the party whose life is insured, he may have the loss payable to his own representatives, or
to his assignee or appointee, and whichever be the form, his own
interest is the same.
It can only be by holding the policy in substance and legal
effect, that of a creditor upon the life of his debtor, that an interest
was necessary on the part of the plaintiff to support it.
I am inclined to regard the insurance as effected by the plaintiff
on the life of Fish, though the policy in form purports to have
been procured by the latter. The plaintiff applied for and obtained
it, as the creditor of Fish, to protect his interest, as such creditor,
in Fish's life. He took the initiatory steps for procuring the
policy-the application stated it to be for his benefit; he paid the
original and all subsequent premiums; it was delivered to him and
he sued upon it as the party in interest, and is the only party
connected with the policy who could maintain an action upon it.
So far the objection of its validity is involved; it will therefore
be treated as a contract in substance between the plaintiff and the
defendants.
It is not at all necessary to discuss the question whether a
policy obtained by a party having no interest in the life insured
would be void, either at common law or under our statute against
betting and gaming. It may be conceded that at common law it
would be a wager policy and void; although it was distinctly held
in Dalby vs. The India and London Life In8urance Company, in
the Exchequer Chamber on error, 80 Eng. C. L. 865, s. c. 28
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Eng. Law & Eq. Rep. 312, that such an insurance was legal at
common law. But the case is not embarrassed by any such question. It was distinctly shown, and the proof in no way controverted, that the plaintiff was a creditor of Fish, when the insurance was effected, in an amount far exceeding the sum named in
the policy, and that at the time of the trial the debt was still
wholly unpaid. He had, therefore, within all the cases, an insurable interest in the life of Fish sufficient to support the policy.
It was in no legal sense a wager contract.
Nor is it necessary to consider the question whether a life policy
is in its nature a contract of indemnity, as marine and fire policies
undoubtedly are. Regarding the policy in this case as substantially a contract of indemnity against the loss of the plaintiff's
debts, and that as an interest was required to support its inception, a continuance of that interest is essential to its perpetuity;
there was no pretence that the debt, or any part of it, had been
paid. All that the case showed was that the Statute of Limitations had apparently run against the demand of the plaintiff at the
death of Fish. But suppose the statute had attached, the interest
of the plaintiff, as a creditor in the continuance of the life of his
debtor, had not ceased entirely. The debt was not extinguished,
as in the case of paywent. It might be renewed by a new promise, and indeed, without such promise, be enforced by action,
unless the defence of the statute was directly interposed. It is
not a legal presumption that when the Statute of Limitations has
once run, the debtor will refuse to revive the debt by a new
promise, or interpose the defence of the statute in an action to
recover it.
But in the contract of life insurance it is enough that the party
effecting the policy had an insurable interest at its inception; and
it is not required that that interest should continue and exist at
the time of the death of the person, whose life is insured, to
entitle the holder of the policy to recover. Policies of insurance
against fire and marine risks are properly contracts of indemnity
-they are so in terms-but it is otherwise with life policies.
"The contract," says PARKE, B., in Dalby vs. The India and
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London Life Insurance Company, 28 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep. 312,
" commonly called ' Life Assurance,' when properly considered, is
a mere contract to pay a certain sum of money on the death of a
person, in consideration of the due payment of a certain annuity
for his life, the amount of the annuity being calculated, in the
first instance, according to the probable duration of the life." * *
"This species of assurance in no way resembles a contract of
indemnity." Indemnity being the general principle which gives
rise to fire and marine insurance, by a mistaken analogy, such a
principle was at one time recognised in life insurance. This
recognition grew out of the decision in Goodsall vs. Boldero, 9
East 72, decided in the King's Bench in 1807, which was followed
and adopted by text writers on insurance both in England and in
this country; but which was overruled on error to the Exchequer Chamber in 1854, in the case of -Dalhy vs. The India, &c.,
Life Insurance Company, supra. In the latter case it was held
that a life policy was not in its natuie a contract of indemnity,
but was 'what it purports to be on its face, a contract to pay a
certain sum in the event of death; and if made by a person having
an interest in the duration of the life, it was sufficient to make it
valid in point of law, that that interest existed at the time of
making the policy. It seems remarkable to me that any other
view should be taken of the question. The contract is not to
make any loss good, or to make compensation. The debt is not
insured. It is an absolute contract to pay, not the amount of a
loss or damage arising from a death, but a specified sum of
money upon the termination of the life insured.
The ground is now abandoned that the action was prematurely
commenced, for the reason that the time fixed in the policy for
the payment of the insurance-money had not expired. Payment,
by the terms of the policy, was to be made within ninety days
after proof had been furnished to the company of the death of
Fish. This proof was furnished in March, 1857, and the suit
was not brought until the middle of August following.
The objection to the proof as to Fish's death, prior to the application for the policy in suit, was properly overruled. Such
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proof was not so far immaterial as to make it error not to exclude it.
The written statements and representations made to the defendants at the time the policy was effected, were that Fish's health
was good, and that he had not been affected, since childhood, with
liver complaint, or general debility. The defendants, in their answer, averred the falsity of these representations, and on the trial
attempted, at least indirectly, to prove them to he so. I think it
was competent for the plaintiff to prove that the representations
were true, by showing that Fish was in fact in good health, and
of a sound constitution. The witnesses of whom the inquiry was
made had known Fish intimately, from 1848 down to the period
when the policy was obtained, and were competent to testify to
the fact of his general good health and soundness, of constitution.
The offer by the defendants to prove the statements of Fish',
made in the fall of 1853, in relation to his intemperate habits,
was properly overruled. Fish was not, after the issuing to the
plaintiff of the policy in suit, a party in interest in that contract,
and could make no statement or admission that would divest the
rights of the plaintiff. He was not in any manner the agent of
the plaintiff after the issuing of the policy, and so could not bind
him. It might, with equal propriety, be pretended that the defendants could prove, by the admissions of Fish, that he had
resided in forbidden districts, or engaged in occupations prohibited
by the policy, "and so escape payment. One class of unsworn
statements of Fish would be about as admissible as the other, to
discharge the defendants from their contract.
The defendants made a general offer to prove by experts in the
business of life insurance that a person who was in the habitual
use to excess of intoxicating drinks would not be considered an
insurable subject. This was rightly excluded. It was entirely
immaterial what description of subject, persons, or companies engaged in the business of life insurance would consider good or bad
risks. The inquiry did not relate to matters of science or skill,
but called in effect for the opinion of witnesses as to what persons
engaged in a particular business would consider prudent to do in
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certain cases. In Joice vs. The Marine Insurance Company, 45
Marine R. 168, the defendants proposed to ask an expert in insurance business whether, in his opinion, the rate of premium for
insurance would be increased by vacating a dwelling-house ? The
Court held that the question whether certain specified facts would
increase the rates of insurance upon the property insured does not
relate to matters of science or skill. It only called for the opinion
of a witness upon the influence which certain facts would have
upon others, and whether they would be induced thereby to charge
higher rate of premium, and was inadmissible.
There was no error in proving, by the witness Holmes, who acted
as the agent of the defendants at Rochester, what occurred at
the interview between him and Marsh. Marsh had been referred to, and had made a written statement as to the health and
habits of Fish, which the defendants bad introduced in evidence,
in connection with the testimony of Marsh himself, that he had no
recollection of ever having seen or signed the paper. The proof
that Holmes took the paper to Marsh, read the questions addressed
to him, and wrote down the answers as he gave them, was certainly
material and'competent. Such proof tended wholly to negative
any presumption that might otherwise possibly be drawn from the
defendants' evidence, that there had been fraud in procuring the
statement of Marsh, or in endeavoring to palm off on the underwriters a worthless life.
The defendants' agent, Holmes, transmitted to the company the
papers on which the policy was issued, among which was a statement of his own, as agent or attorney. In this statement he answered that Fish did not, in his opinion, indulge in any practices
or habits which have or will impair his constitution and general
health. The defendants had pleaded this answer, and averred that
it was false, and was known to be so, both by Fish and the plaintiff. The precise question was put to Holmes, as a witness upon
the stand, a general objection interposed, which was overruled,
and the witness answered as he had previously in his written statement. I do not think it was error to allow the question to be
answered. The testimony bore directly upon the issue presented
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by the defendants' answer. It is now urged that the objection to
the question should have been sustained: first, for the reason that
it was not one of science, but related to a commonplace fact, and
called not for the knowledge of the witness, but for the opinion
of the witness as to the existence of the fact; and, second, that
if the question was one of science, the witness was not shown to
have possessed any scientific skill on the subject. But the answer
is, that no such grounds of objection were pointed or urged to the
Judge.
Among the papers, on the faith of which the policy was issued.
was a written statement, in the form of questions and answers by
Dr. Shipman, the family physician of Fish. This statement was
introduced in evidence by the defendants, and it was claimed that
his answers were warranties. Every important answer was an
expression of opinion or belief. The defendants, in their answer
to the complaint, had put in issue the truth of the representations
in the statements. On the trial, Shipman was produced as a witness by the plaintiff, who testified to his examination of Fish in
reference to insurance upon his life; that he examined him carefully, and he appeared at the time to be in very good health. The
written statement which he had signed after such examination was
then shown to him, and he was asked the question, ,Did you then
believe the answers to those questions (referring to the questions
in the statement) to be correct ?" This was objected to generally,
and the objection overruled. It was not error. The defendants,
in their answer, had in substance alleged a fraudulent statement
to have been made by Dr. Shipman, in saying that he believed
what he did not believe. Such a conclusion, I think, the plaintiff
had the right to exclude by the proof covered by the exception.
All, in fact, the inquiry amounted to was, whether the answers in
the witness's statement had been made truthfully and in good
faith.
On the cross-examination of Dr. Shipman, the defendants' coun
sel put this question: -If you had known that Fish did habitually
indulge in the use of intoxicating drinks to excess, would you have
regarded that as a habit or practice that would impair his health
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or constitution ?" And subsequently, on the cross-examination of
Dr. Dean, the medical examiner of the company, he was asked,
- Had you known at the time you made this examination (referring
to the examination made for the defendants), that Fish was in the
habit of using intoxicating liquors to excess, would you have
regarded his life healthy, and the risk good ?" An objection to
these questions was sustained by the Court. This testimony was
incompetent, both on principle and authority. It was of no consequence what, in the opinion of these physicians, in certain cases
and under a certain state of facts, would be a good or bad risk for
an insurance company to take, or what circumstances should be
considered on the question of increasing or lessening the rates of
insurance. These witnesses might give their opinion on matters
of science connected with their profession; but were not receivable
to state their views of the manner in which others would probably
be influenced, if certain specified facts existed: Jefferson Insuranee Company vs. Cotheal, 7 Wend. 72, 78, 79 ;,Durrell vs.
Bederly, 1 Holt 283.; Campbell vs. Bichards, 5 Barn. & Ad. 480.
It was not error to admit the statements of Dr. Dean, the
defendants' examining physician, and Holmes, their agent at
Rochester. These were parts of the papers on which the policy
was issued, as appeared from the defendants' answer. The defendants themselves had introduced the other papers, being all except
the statements of their agents, and made them part of the evidence
in the case. There was no impropriety, under such circumstances,
that all the papers should- appear in the case. It was the right of
the plaintiff to lay before the jury all the papers on which the
company acted, when it decided to grant the policy.
It was not erroneous for the Court to charge that Holmes, in
making his statement, under date of 16th July, 1853, was to be
deemed and regarded in law as the agent of the company, and-not
of the plaintiff. It is very clear, from the evidence, that at the
time the policy was effected, Holmes was acting as the agent of
the defendants at Rochester, and it was through him the business
was negotiated. There was no proof showing that Holmes had
any agency whatsoever for the plaintiff or for Fish, or that either
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of them knew that he was to make or did make any such statement. The paper signed by him, on its face purports to be that
of an agent of the defendants.
The exception to that part of the charge, in which the jury were
instructed that the statement of Marsh was not a warranty, was
not well taken. This statement was not so referred to in the
policy as to become a part of it, or be made a warranty. The
policy in terms states that it was issued upon the faith of certain
statements and representations, dated July 15th, 1853, and upon
file, respecting the life, health, and medical history of Fish. These
were the statements of Fish and Dr. Shipman. Marsh's statement
was made on the 16th July, 1853, and there was no reference to
it in the application of Fish; nor did either Fish or the plaintiff
procure it to be made, or know anything of the contents of the
paper. It seems that it was a rule of the company to require of
the person applying for insurance, a reference to some third
person from whom information might be obtained respecting his
general health and habits of life. In this case Fish referred to
Marsh, and Holmes, the agent of the company, procured the
statement of the latter, and forwarded it with the other papers to
the office in Connecticut. The statement was not made as a part
of the application of Fish or the plaintiff, nor was such application based upon it. It not being furnished by the plaintiff or
Fish, nor the application based upon it, it was not their statement,- and hence not their warranty. A statement which the
plaintiff did not furnish or rely upon, and of the nature of which
he had no knowledge, cannot be converted by the defendants into
a warranty to defeat the policy, although they may have been, to
some extent, influenced by such statement in issuing it. The
Court went quite far enough in instructing the jury in substance
that as Marsh had been referred to as an acquaintance of Fish,
the plaintiff would be responsible for the truth and honesty of his
statements; and if, in point of fact, they were untrue, whether
such untruth originated in fraud, or mere negligence or want of
recollection, it should avoid the policy.
The third and only remaining branch of the charge singled out
VoL. XIL-12
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for exception was the instruction "that if Fish answered frankly
and truly all the questions put to him, then there was no concealment. The mere omission to state matter not called for by any
specific or general question would not be a concealment, and would
not affect the validity of the policy." This was not wrong. It
may be conceded that if the applicant, when a specific or even
general question is put to him, which would elicit a fact material
to the risk, and the fact is untruly stated or concealed, it would
vitiate the policy; but I know of no case in the law of life insurance or fire insurance, in which the insurers, having framed and
put to the insured, and having had fully answered by him a series
of questions, calling for such information as they desired touching
the subject insured, have been discharged from their contract,
because the -insured did not go further, and state what was not
called for in the interrogatories. As was said by the learned Judge,
in the Court below, "the presumption is, that the insurers questioned the party upon all subjects which they deemed material,
and all which were in the contemplation of the parties at the time,
and beyond that, clearly a party is not bound to disclose." The
judgment of the Supreme Court should be affirmed.
BALCOM, J., delivered a brief opinion to the same effect,. and all
the Judges concurred, except EMOTT, J., who was for reversal, on
the ground of want of insurable interest in the plaintiff, and SELDEN, J., who did not sit in the case.
time of the contract, or must it continue
until action is brought on the policy ?
These various points will be briefly
coming so common as a security for the examined.
1. The rule of the common law as to
payment of debts, that important questions concerning it will soon be offered the right to insure where the insured
to the Courts in the different States for has no interest. This topic maybe disadjudication. What is the nature of life cussed in respect to marine insurance
insurance? Is it a contract of indem- and to life insurance.
1. Marine Insurance.
nity, or in the nature of a wager? Must
Before'the Statute of 9 George 2, c.
one who insures the life of another, have,
in the absence of statute regulations, an 27, contracts of marine insurance asinterest in the life insured ? When an sumed two forms, either that of a coninterest is required by statute, will it be tract of indemnity, or of a wagering
enough that the interest exists at the contract. Where nothing was said in

The question raised in this case,
though not expressly decided, is one of
.growing interest. Life Insurance is be-
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the policy on the subject, the presumption was that the contract was for indemnity against loss, and the interest
must be averred in the declaration, and
proved at the trial. A fortioriwas such
proof necessary when the policy stated
that the insured had an interest. If the
insured desired to make a wagering
contract, there must be an express understanding to that effect. It was commonly expressed in the policy by the
words "interest or no. interest," or
"without further proof of interest than
the policy."
The history of the introduction of
these clauses into marine policies is
given by Lord HARDWICxE, in The Sadlers' Company vs..Badcock, 2 Atkyns 654,
(A. D. 1743.)
The validity of such
policies was admitted by him though
strongly disapproved. This case was
decided three years before the 19 Geo.
2, c. 27. which abrogated these contracts. After this statute was enacted,
there could be no marine insurances
except contracts of indemnity.
The
reasons for sustaining the contracts at
common law are well expounded by the
majority of the Judges in Lucena vs.
Crawford, 5 Bos. & Pull. 296, (A. D.
1806.) "It was clearly established as
law among all the commercial nations
of Europe, that the insured must have
an interest in the thing insured and
could not recover without proving the
loss. * * * But as this law was introduced in favor of the insurers, and to
prevent deceitful and unlawful gaming,
the parties, by stipulations inserted expressly for that purpose in the policy,
might waive the proof of interest, on
the principle that any one can renounce
a right intended for his benefit, and
this was usually ddne in the manner
expressed in the statute." In Cousins
vs. Nantes, 3 Taunton 513, (A. 1).1811,)
the Court of Exchequer Chamber says

"that it was solemnly determined in
Lucena vs. Crawford, that at common
law wager policies or insurances without interest were lawful." In that caso
the same view was taken. MANSFIELD.
C. J., showed forcibly the reasons for
disclosing on the face of the policy the
fact whether the contract was or was
not a wager. We do not find this doctrine impugned anwhere in England.
except by a characteristic "doubt" ou
the part of Lord ELDoN, in Lucena vs.
Crawford. Whenever there is no statute to the contrary, wager policies in
marine insurance must be lawful. This
rule was never applied to fire insurances.
and was expressly rejected as far as that
branch of the subject is concerned, by
Lord HARDWICKE, in the Sadlers' Company vs. Badcock, supra. His principal
reason was, that as there were then no
precedents affecting fire insurance, he
was at liberty to follow his own judgment, which was adverse to the validity
of wagering contracts.
2. Life Insurance. This branch of
insurance admits of two propositions.
(1.) The contract is essentially a wager
contract, and not a contract of indemnity. (2.) The wager is lawful at common law. (1.) It is undeniable that
life insurance cannot logically be a contract of indemnity. It is in the nature
of a wager, or, as Vice-Chancellor WooD
expressed it, in Law vs. London Indisputable Life Policy Co., I Kay & Johnson 223, it is the equivalent of a series
of wagers. No one would deny this
statement if the insurance was of one's
own life. There is no loss in such case.
The event contemplated is sure to happen: the uncertainty consists only in
the fact that it may happen at an earlier
or a later day, and the calculation of
premiums is made on that basis. The
nature of the contract is the same,
or the
whether one insures his own life,
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life of another. It was undoubtedly at
one time supposed that life insurance
was a contract of indemnity. Godsall
vs. Boldero, 9 East 72. Lord ELLEx-

at a future time, a fixed sum calculatel
by them with reference to the value of
the premiums which are to be paid in
order to purchase the postponed payBOROUGH'S lauguage in this case was so ment. Whatever event may happen
loose that he asserted in general terms, meanwhile, is a matter of indifference
that all life insurance is a contract of to the company. They do not found
indemnity. This position will, of course, their calculations upon that, but simply
not be maintained. The doctrine in the upon the probabilities of human life,
particular case to which he applied it and they get paid the full value of that
has been discarded. The facts in God- calculation. On what principle can it
sall vs. Boldero, were that a creditor of be said that if some one else satisfies
Mr. Pitt had insured his life and the the risk, on account of which the policy
debt continued to the time of Mr. Pitt's may have been effected, the company
death. After Mr. Pitt's death, the claim should be released from their contract ?"
was paid by his executors from funds This distinction was noticed in this
granted by Parliament for the payment country for the first time in the case of
of this and other debts. The insurance The Trenton Mutual Life Insurance Co.
company set up this payment as a de- vs. Johnson, 4 Zabriskie 576, (A. D.
fence to an action to recover the amount 1854). The line of argument in this
covered by the policy. The Court, in case, which was decided in the same
deciding that the creditor could not re- year with Dalby vs. The India and Loncover, said: "This assurance, as every don Insurance Co., is very similar to
other to which the law gives effect, is a that of the English cases.
(2). A wager contract of life insurcontract of indemnity, as distinguished
from a contract by way of gaming or ance is valid at common law. This was
wagering :" 9 East 81. But in Dalby incidentally decided in the case of Dalby
vs. The India and London Life Assurance vs. The India and London Life InsurCompany, 15 C. B. 3§5, (A. D. 1854), ance Co., and directly adjudicated in
this case was overruled in its principle, the case of The British Insurance Co. vs.
and it was denied that life insurance is Magee, in the Irish Exchequer Chamber.
a contract of indemnity, whether it be (A. D. 1834), Cooke & Alcock's Rep. 182.
the insurance of one's own life or of the The statute of 14 Geo. 3, o "48, did
life of another. The ground of this de- not extend to Ireland, and the question
ciion is well stated by Vice-Chancellor was as to the rule of the common law.
WoOD, in Law vs. London Indisputable It was held, though the insurance in
Life Policy Co., 1 Kay & Johnson 228. that case was a pure wager contract.
He says, "Policies of insurance against that it was valid. It was argued, that
fire or marine risk are contracts to re- assuming it to he a wager contract, it
cover the loss which parties may sustain was of that species of wagers which was
from particular causes. Where such a void at common law on grounds of publoss is made good aliunde, the companies liopolicy. This argument was rejected
are not liable for a loss which has not as unfounded, and the insured recovered.
occurred; but in a life policy, there is There are other Irish cases to the same
no such provision. It is simply a con- point. Ferguson vs. Lomax, 2 Drury
tract that in consideration of a certain & Walsh 120, 238; Scott vs. Roose, I
annual payment, the company will pay Long & Town's Rep. 583; Shannon va
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Nugent, 1 Hayes Rep. 539. See also
in this country, Trenton Mutual Life
Insurance Co- vs. Johnson, 4 Zabriskie
676. There is, however, great force in
the suggestions of SELDEN, J., in Ruse
vs. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 23 N. Y.
516, which maintain that "such insurances not only afford facilities for a demcralizing system of gaming, but furnish
strong temptations to the parties interested to bring about, if possible, the
event insured against." These considerations were, however, urged to the
Irish Court, and were rejected. So
strongly did they affect the New York
Court of Appeals in that case, that it
declared that wager policies were void
at common law. It is a singular fact
that this was held by that tribunal to
be the common law of New Jersey, when
the highest Court of that State (see
4 Zabriskie 576) had, eight years before, held that wager policies were
not void at common law. None of the
cases in favor of this view appear to
have been cited in Ruse vs. Mutual
Benefit Life Insurance Co. The absence
of research in the argument must tend
materially to weaken the effect of the
decision. The same remark may be
made respecting Bevin vs. Connecticut
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 23 Conn. 244.
The contract of life insurance was said
to be a contract of indemnity. None
of the recent cases appear to have been
cited. In any event the authorities are
probably too numerous and strong to be
overcome by any considerations of their
intrinsic propriety.
IL We have now to consider the
bearing of statutes upon the validity
of such insurances. The statute of 14
Geo. 3, c. 48, should be noticed in
order to understand the full effect of the
decision in Dalby vs. The India and
London Life Insurance Co. The first
and third sections are the most important. The first section provides in sub-

stance that no insurance on lives shall
be made wherein the assured has no
interest, or by way of betting and gaming. This section would have permitted
a person who had a small interest to insure for a large sum. This difficulty
was met by the third section, which
provided that in all cases where the insured hath interest in the life insured,
no greater sum shall be recovered from
the insurers than the amount or value
of the interest of the insured in the life.
The settled construction of the first section is, that it is enough to satisfy the
statute if the insured has an interest at
the time the insurance is made, and that
if the interest ceases, the insured will
still have a right to recover: Dalby vs.
The India and London Fire Insurance
Co. A recent decision of the Court of
Queen's Bench holds the true construction of the third section is that the word
"hath" refers to the-interest existing
when the insurance was made, and that
the insured cannot recover beyond that
amount. The result is that he can recover an amount equal to his interest at
the time of the execution of the contract,
and no more: Hebden vs. West, (A. D.
1863), 9 London Jurist N. S. 747.
In the State of New York, there is a
statute concerning wagers, which, it
may be supposed, has nearly the same
effect upon the contract of life insurance
that the statute of 14 Geo. 3, c. 48,
has in England. It provides that all
wagers, &c., shall be void, but that this
provision shall not affect any insurance
made in good faith, for the security or
indemnity of the party insured. The
reasonable construction of this act is,
that it only affects the contract at the
time it is made. Perhaps the words
"in good faith," &c., prevent the insured from recovering an amount greater
than the interest which he had at the
time when the policy was executed.
In other States, where thero is no

